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The Spurious Allure of Pass-Through Parity
Karen C. Burke*
In 2017, Congress reduced tax rates on both corporate and noncorporate
income. The drafters invoked the concept of pass-through parity to justify
lower rates on noncorporate business income, resulting in a new and highly
controversial deduction for pass-through owners under § 199A. The concept
of pass-through parity conflates equitable treatment of different entity forms
with equitable distribution of the ultimate tax burden among labor and
capital. The flawed rationale for § 199A may be viewed as an attempt to
preserve the pre-2017 preference for pass-through income; conceptually, the
advantage of lower corporate rates is limited to the availability of a higher
after-tax rate of return on reinvested corporate earnings, obviating concerns
about mass conversions. Despite the stated goal of distinguishing labor
income from capital income in noncorporate businesses, the purported
guardrails under § 199A provide a substantial subsidy for active passthrough owners by offering a lower tax rate on commingled labor and capital
returns. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of parity, the reduced corporate tax
rate seems unlikely to significantly alter the choice of organizational form,
at least in the near term, given the inherent instability of the 2017 legislation.
More significantly, the altered rate structure enhances the ability of owners
of close corporations and pass-through businesses to recharacterize labor
income as capital income and to avoid employment taxes. The pass-through
deduction benefits primarily high-income owner-managers and undermines
the equity and efficiency of the tax system. In light of growing concern over
inequality and unsustainable deficits, the case for outright repeal of § 199A
is even more urgent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2017 Act, Congress radically reduced the tax rates on both
corporate and noncorporate business income.1 Following the 1986 Act,
the pass-through sector (partnerships, S corporations, and sole
proprietorships) dramatically increased their share of business income,
greatly complicating any fundamental reform of the U.S. corporate tax
system.2 During the hasty 2017 legislative process, noncorporate
businesses demanded a lower rate on pass-through business income—
taxed at the individual level—to compensate for the 21% corporate rate.3
The compromise, § 199A, provides a 20% deduction for qualifying
business income earned by individual pass-through owners.4 Just as the
corporate rate reduction was widely promoted as improving the
international competitiveness of U.S. corporations, § 199A was justified
in terms of maintaining tax parity between corporate and noncorporate
businesses.5 Nevertheless, the concept of pass-through parity has proven
* Professor and Richard B. Stephens Eminent Scholar, University of Florida, Levin College of
Law.
1. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, § 11011(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2063 (2017)
(adding the pass-through deduction for qualified business income).
2. By temporarily inverting the corporate and individual rates, the 1986 Tax Reform Act helped
to fuel the rise of pass-throughs. See George A. Plesko & Eric J. Toder, Changes in the
Organization of Business Activity and Implications for Tax Reform, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 855, 856–57
(2013) (explaining that provisions in the 1986 Tax Reform Act had, prior to 2017, increased
incentives for businesses to be taxed as pass-throughs rather than as C corporations subject to a
higher tax burden).
3. See Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 49,
49–50 (2018) (noting the pivotal role of Senators Johnson and Corker, both active business owners
who stood to benefit significantly from the pass-through deduction).
4. I.R.C. § 199A. The deduction effectively reduces the top individual rate from 37% to 29.6%
(80% × 37%) for eligible pass-through owners.
5. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC
LAW 115–97, at 20 (Comm. Print 2018) (“The provision [§ 199A] reflects Congress’s belief
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singularly devoid of meaning, while the § 199A deduction offers highincome owner-managers a fertile field for shifting income and avoiding
employment taxes.6
This Article explores the likely effects of § 199A on the choice of
business form, particularly the relative tax efficiency of different passthrough types. Contrary to the oft-repeated claim that § 199A was needed
to prevent noncorporate entities from converting to corporate form,7 Part
II suggests that § 199A represented pass-through owners’ attempt to
preserve the pre-2017 pass-through preference, notwithstanding the
altered rate structure. Part III considers the illusory nature of § 199A’s
constraints on the 20% deduction for primarily service businesses,8
coupled with a lack of any restrictions under § 199A on income derived
from publicly traded partnerships and real estate investment trusts. Part
IV maintains that the traditional benefits of operating in partnership
form—including the ease of stepping up inside basis with only a single
level of tax—are likely to outweigh the advantage of the 21% rate when
a C corporation accumulates and eventually distributes income. Part V
addresses active owner-managers’ ability to use close corporations and
pass-throughs to avoid employment taxes by recharacterizing labor
income as capital income. The Article concludes that progressive tax
reform should include repeal of § 199A and closing of employment tax
gaps.
that . . . treating corporate and noncorporate business income more similarly . . . under the Federal
income tax requires distinguishing labor income from capital income in a noncorporate business.”)
[hereinafter JCT, GENERAL EXPLANATION]; H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 129 (2017); S. COMM. ON
THE BUDGET, 115TH CONG., RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO H. CON. RES.
71, at 19 (Comm. Print 2017) (describing reasons for reducing the corporate income tax rate). The
Conference Report incorporates the sparse legislative history for § 199A. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466,
at 205–24 (2017) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]; but see Jane G. Gravelle, Does the Concept
of Competitiveness Have Meaning in Formulating Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 TAX L. REV. 323,
323 (2012) (“[I]nternational competitiveness . . . is a concept that is almost always simply asserted
and virtually nowhere defined.”).
6. For an early assessment, see David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games,
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1459 (2019)
(describing § 199A as “the most notorious change” of the 2017 tax legislation); see generally Ari
Glogower & David Kamin, The Progressivity Ratchet, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1499 (2020)
(highlighting constraints the Act imposes on policymakers and its impact on future tax reform).
7. For a critique of this view, see generally Michael S. Knoll, The TCJA and the Questionable
Incentive to Incorporate, 162 TAX NOTES 977 (2019) [hereinafter Knoll I]; Michael S. Knoll, The
TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to Incorporate, Part 2, 162 TAX NOTES 1447 (2019)
[hereinafter Knoll II]. For a response to Knoll, see generally Ari Glogower & David Kamin,
Sheltering Income Through a Corporation, 164 TAX NOTES 507 (2019) (questioning whether
current tax law creates a level playing field for corporate and pass-through entities).
8. Under § 199A, income of a business engaged in law, health, accounting, consulting,
performing arts, or other professional services, or whose principal asset is the reputation or skill of
one or more of its owners or employees, generally does not qualify for the deduction. I.R.C.
§§ 199A(d)(2), 1202(e)(3)(A).
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II. PASS-THROUGH PARITY—A MEANINGLESS CONCEPT
A. Flawed Rationale for § 199A
Although the House and Senate versions of § 199A diverged, the end
results were remarkably similar. The House adopted a formulary
approach—a 30% safe-harbor exclusion for the deemed “capital”
component—for mixed returns from labor and capital when pass-through
owner-managers actively participate in the business.9 The House’s 30%
exclusion morphed into the Senate’s 20% deduction for pass-through
business income for both active and passive owners. Under the House
version, active owner-managers would have been taxed at a higher
blended rate than passive owners.10 Given the near revolt by pass-through
stakeholders, the House version was never a serious contender as a reform
proposal.11 By contrast, the Senate version allowed high-income active
owner-managers to reduce their entire business income (including labor
returns) by the full pass-through deduction of 20%, reducing their
effective individual rate to 29.6%.
The legislative history of the 2017 Act is remarkably devoid of any
serious explanation of what the drafters believed constituted tax parity
between corporate and noncorporate businesses. The notion that
Congress’s action reflects the flawed implementation of a “neutrality
principle” misses the mark.12 It obscures the underlying reality that
lobbying efforts leading up to § 199A were activated mainly by a desire
to maintain (and potentially expand) the existing rate preference for passthrough income over corporate income. While supporters claimed that the
§ 199A deduction was needed to maintain the “competitive” position of
pass-through businesses vis-à-vis large multinational businesses,13 only
a handful of large pass-through entities even plausibly compete with
9. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 212–13 (setting the capital percentage at 30% for
active businesses). Qualified business income was defined as 100% of income from any passive
business activity plus the capital percentage of net business income from any active business
activity. Id. at 209–10.
10. Under the House version, passive pass-through business income was taxed at a maximum
rate of 25% but active pass-through business income was taxed at a higher blended rate of 35.22%
(70% × 39.6%) + (30% × 25%). CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 212. The Senate version
reduced the pre-2017 top individual rate from 39.6% to 37%.
11. The House bill was perceived as doing “little or nothing for active business owners.” C.
Wells Hall III, New Code Sec. 199A and the Configurations of Qualified Business Income: Leveling
the Playing Field for Pass-Thru Entities After the C Corporation Rate Cut, J. PASSTHROUGH
ENTITIES 45, 46 (2018).
12. Glogower & Kamin, supra note 6, at 1507 (“[T]he corporate rate reduction and Section
199A both reflect a similar mistake: Congress’s failure to properly apply the neutrality principle.”).
13. See SCOTT GREENBERG & NICOLE KAEDING, FISCAL FACT NO. 593: REFORMING THE
PASS-THROUGH DEDUCTION 2 (Tax Found., 2018) (“Supporters of the [§ 199A] deduction argue
that it . . . helps put the pass-through sector on an equal footing with the largest multinational
corporations.”).
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multinational corporations.14 Instead, a targeted special rate (or
equivalent deduction) for pass-through business income emerged as an
alternative to an individual tax rate cut that was prohibitively expensive
in terms of revenue loss.15 Despite attempts to justify the provision in
terms of creating a “level tax playing field between the different kinds of
entities,”16 § 199A was always a political, not an economic, necessity.17
B. Preserving Pass-Through Preference
Prior to the 2017 Act, pass-through income was generally taxed more
lightly than corporate income.18 Indeed, following the 1986 tax
legislation, the preferred treatment of pass-through income accounted for
the dramatic rise of pass-throughs and precipitous decline of C
corporations.19 The following table illustrates the relative pass-through
preference immediately before and after the 2017 Act.

14. See Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced
Precarious Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 334 (2018) (noting that many larger businesses also
clearly qualified for the deduction).
15. Although the temporary individual tax cuts generally expire in 2026, § 199A permanently
cut tax rates for pass-through owners in the top 1%. See Michael Cooper et al., Business in the
United States: Who Owns It, and How Much Tax Do They Pay?, 30 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 91, 94
(2016) (“Overall, 69% of pass-through income earned by individuals accrues to the top 1%.”).
16. Glogower & Kamin, supra note 6, at 1523 (quoting former Congressional Budget Office
Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin).
17. Pass-throughs could simply have checked-the-box to be treated as corporations. See Michael
L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 157 TAX NOTES 1731, 1735–36
(2017).
18. See Plesko & Toder, supra note 2, at 868–69 (predicting that a corporate rate reduction
below the individual tax rate would reverse the organizational choices following the 1986 Act).
19. Id. at 861 (noting that the share of net business income attributable to C corporations
declined from 70% in 1986 to 40% in 2008).
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Top Statutory Rates in 2017 and 2018
Full Distribution
2017

2018

C
Corp.
(1)

Passthrough
(2)

C
Corp.
(3)

Pass-through
(no § 199A)
(4)

Pass-through
(§ 199A)
(5)

Pass-through
(§ 199A) (no
3.8% tax) (6)

EntityLevel Tax

35%

0%

21%

0%

0%

0%

Individual
Tax

20%

39.6%

20%

37%

29.6%

29.6%

NIIT

3.8%

3.8%

3.8%

3.8%

3.8%

50.5%

43.4%

39.8%

40.8%

33.4%

29.6%

−1%

6.4%

10.2%

Net Tax
Rate
Rate
Differential

7.1%

In 2017, corporate income was subject to a top 35% rate at the entity
level, and dividends were subject to a top 23.8% tax in the shareholder’s
hands. If a corporation distributed all of its earnings currently as
dividends (“full distribution”), the net double tax burden was 50.5%,
compared to a maximum pass-through tax burden of 43.4%.20 Thus, the
benefit of pass-through taxation was a 7.1 percentage point reduction in
the effective federal tax rate.
In the case of full distribution, the 2017 Act reduces the combined
corporate-shareholder rate to 39.8%, which represents a 10.7 percentage
point reduction in the overall corporate tax burden (50.5% versus
39.8%).21 Notwithstanding this dramatic reduction in the double-tax
burden, the 2017 Act also reduces the tax burden on pass-through income
(assuming § 199A is fully available) to 33.4%, or 6.4 percentage points
below the combined corporate-shareholder rate.22 The slight reduction
(0.7%) in the preference for pass-through income in comparison to
corporate income (from 7.1% to 6.4%) seems unlikely to spur a mass

20. Compare col. (1) and (2). The combined corporate-shareholder rate (50.5%) equals 35%
plus 23.8% × (1 − 35%).
21. See col. (3). The combined corporate-shareholder rate (39.8%) equals 21% plus
23.8% × (1 − 21%).
22. See col. (5).
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exodus from pass-throughs.23 If a corporation expects to distribute
dividends, the double tax continues to impose a significant burden on
corporate income.24
For high-income active owner-managers, pass-throughs offer yet
another advantage over C corporations—namely, the ability to avoid the
3.8% net investment income tax (NIIT) under § 1411, while also avoiding
the parallel 3.8% Medicare tax on wages (FICA) and self-employment
income (SECA).25 S corporation active owner-managers can (and
notoriously do) minimize their employment tax liabilities by paying
themselves low (or no) salaries, thereby increasing net business income
that is passed through unburdened by FICA taxes.26 While pass-through
income earned by general partners is generally treated as selfemployment income, limited partners are exempt from SECA taxes but
are subject to the § 1411 tax on passive income.27 Nevertheless, active
owner-managers who own both a general and limited partnership
interests routinely claim that the “limited partner exception” allows them
to exclude up to 99% of their distributive share from SECA taxes; their
entire distributive share is exempt from the NIIT because they are active
in the business.28 When § 199A applies and the NIIT does not, the passthrough advantage for high-income owner-managers is 10.2 percentage
points (29.6% versus 39.8%).29
23. Compare col. (2) and (5).
24. See Projecting the Mass Conversion from Pass-Through Entities to C-Corporations, UNIV.
PA.: PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL, http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/
6/12/projecting-the-mass-conversion-from-pass-through-entities-to-c-corporations
[https://perma.cc/772N-MGMU] (June 13, 2018) [hereinafter PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL]
(illustrating that between 1959 and 2015, the average dividend payout rate was 52%).
25. The NIIT base does not include FICA wages and self-employment income taken into
account under SECA. See generally Karen C. Burke, Exploiting the Medicare Tax Loophole, 21
FLA. TAX REV. 570 (2018) (discussing gaps in the three taxes). The NIIT generally applies only to
income and gain from a trade or business that is a passive activity with respect to the taxpayer
(within the meaning of I.R.C. § 469) or a trade or business consisting of trading financial
instruments or commodities (a “Financial Trading Business”) (as defined in I.R.C. § 475(e)(2)).
I.R.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (c)(2).
26. See Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225 (ruling that, because S shareholders do not carry on
a trade or business directly, their distributive shares are not included in self-employment income);
see also OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GAPS BETWEEN THE NET
INVESTMENT INCOME TAX BASE AND THE EMPLOYMENT TAX BASE 2 (2016) (finding that 60% of
active S income escapes both FICA and the NIIT).
27. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13). Enacted in 1977, the exception was originally intended to prevent
passive limited partners from paying SECA tax on their distributive share in order to qualify for
Social Security benefits. See David W. Mayo & Rebecca C. Freeland, Delimiting Limited Partners:
Self-Employment Tax of Limited Partners, 66 TAX LAW. 391, 393 (2013) (describing origins of
limited partner exception).
28. Burke, supra note 25, at 601 (“The individual investment professionals claim that they owe
self-employment taxes only on a distributive share of income attributable to the 1% GP
interest . . . [and they] also claim that their fee income is exempt from section 1411 . . . .”).
29. Compare col. (3) and (6).
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To a lesser extent, use of the corporate form also provides a Medicare
tax saving. First, the portion of pretax earnings used to pay corporate tax
is effectively deducted from the Medicare tax base; only the aftercorporate-tax retained earnings are subject to the shareholder-level
dividend tax.30 In addition, deferring the Medicare tax on after-tax
retained earnings until distribution is essentially equivalent to exempting
the investment return on the deferred amount.31 This deferral benefit is
not offset by any compensatory tax, since no Medicare tax is imposed at
the corporate level on the deferred amounts. By comparison, active passthrough owners’ ability to entirely avoid the 3.8% tax outweighs these
two corporate advantages—reduction in the Medicare tax base and yield
exemption. When corporate earnings are withdrawn as wages, dividends,
or capital gains, the 3.8% tax is unavoidable. Under current law, active
pass-through owner-managers taxed at 29.6% enjoy a 10.6 percentage
point advantage over other high-income wage earners.32 Subjecting all
pass-through business income to the 3.8% tax (through FICA, SECA, or
the NIIT) would reduce the pass-through preference and protect the
Medicare tax base.
C. Understanding the Corporate Advantage
The concern about mass conversions to corporate form focuses on the
gap between the maximum tax rates on retained corporate income and
pass-through income (taxed immediately whether or not distributed). As
illustrated below, the gap increased significantly as a result of the 2017
Act.

30. Under current rates, the effective corporate deduction for the Medicare tax saves 0.8%
(0.21 × 0.038 = 0.7980), reducing the Medicare tax burden from 3.8% to 3%.
31. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate
Environment 19 n.35 (USC Gould Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13-5,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239360 [https://perma.cc/R6AZP7SN] (“[The advantage] boils down to earning a tax-free return on the compounding of each
year’s . . . deferred tax for the period of the deferral.”).
32. Since the employer half of the Medicare tax (1.45%) is deductible, the highest marginal tax
rate on wages is approximately 40.2% (rather than 40.8%). Kamin et al., supra note 6, at 1452–53
n.47.
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Top Statutory Rates in 2017 and 2018
Full Retention
2017
C
PassCorp. through
(1)
(2)

C
Corp.
(3)

Pass-through
(no § 199A)
(4)

2018
Pass-through
(§ 199A)
(5)

Pass-through
(§ 199A) (no
3.8% tax) (6)

Entity-Level
Tax

35%

0%

21%

0%

0%

0%

Individual
Income Tax

0%

39.6%

0%

37%

29.6%

29.6%

NIIT

0%

3.8%

0%

3.8%

3.8%

0%

35%

43.4%

21%

40.8%

33.4%

29.6%

−19.8%

−12.4%

−8.6%

Net Tax
Rate
Rate
Differential

−8.4%

Assuming full retention of corporate earnings and no § 199A
deduction, the 2017 Act increased the gap between the maximum
corporate tax rate and the maximum pass-through tax rate by 11.4
percentage points (from 8.4% to 19.8%).33 Even after the § 199A
deduction, the gap increased by 4 percentage points (from 8.4% to
12.4%).34 The 2017 Act also increased the stakes for active ownermanagers to avoid the 3.8% Medicare/NIIT tax, while maximizing their
distributive share of qualified business income eligible for the § 199A
deduction. For this significant category of pass-through participants, the
gap between the maximum pass-through tax rate and the maximum
corporate tax rate is currently 8.6%.35 On the one hand, reducing the
maximum corporate tax rate significantly below the individual income
tax rate threatens to tilt the choice of organizational form away from passthrough entities;36 on the other hand, the widely perceived instability of
the 2017 Act militates against this effect.37
33. Compare col. (2) and (4).
34. Compare col. (2) and (5).
35. See col. (6).
36. Plesko & Toder, supra note 2, at 869 (noting that an individual tax rate exceeding the
corporate income tax rate may reverse organizational choice).
37. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 57 (noting the United States’ political instability and low public
support for the Act).
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In the run-up to the 2017 Act, the notion of pass-through parity
provided a useful rhetorical gambit to justify lower rates on pass-through
income but lacked any rigorous conceptual underpinning. When
distributions are deferred, corporate shareholders enjoy a higher after-tax
rate of return on reinvested earnings taxed at 21%; the longer the period
of deferral, the greater the advantage.38 The corporate advantage—the
ability to retain and reinvest corporate earnings—depends on the
relationship between the combined corporate-shareholder tax rate and the
maximum individual tax rate. Under current law (ignoring the 3.8% tax),
the combined corporate-shareholder tax rate would be identical to the
maximum individual rate (37%) if the dividend tax were increased
modestly to 20.25% rounded.39 Corporate earnings of $100 would attract
a corporate tax of $21 and the after-corporate-tax distribution ($79)
would attract a shareholder-level tax of $16 ($79 × 20.25%), or a total tax
of $37 equal to the maximum individual tax on $100 of earnings outside
the corporation. Under the 2017 Act, no such rate identity exists because
the maximum individual tax burden (37%) slightly exceeds the combined
corporate-shareholder tax burden (36.8%), resulting in a “negative tax
wedge” of 0.2%.40
To understand the corporate advantage, it is helpful to think of
corporate income as actually subject to two different tax rates. The return
on originally invested capital is subject to a combined corporateshareholder tax burden of 36.8%, slightly below the individual rate of
37%. By contrast, the return on reinvested earnings is effectively taxed
only at the 21% corporate rate and permanently escapes tax at the
shareholder level.41 While the corporate advantage is often framed in
terms of deferral, the actual advantage is the ability to earn a higher aftertax rate of return on reinvested earnings (unreduced by the ultimate

38. See Daniel Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing Corporate Rates, 126
TAX NOTES 641, 646–48 (2010) (illustrating advantages of reinvesting lower-taxed earnings in the
corporation).
39. The dividend rate (20.25%) equals (37% − 21%) / (1 − 21%). See Daniel Halperin,
Corporate Rate Reduction and Fairness to Passthrough Entities, 147 TAX NOTES 1299, 1300 n.11
(2015) (explaining that the distribution rate (d) equals (p − c) / (1 − c), where p is the personal tax
rate and c is the corporate tax rate).
40. Richard Prisinzano & James Pearce, Tax-Based Switching of Business Income 4 (Penn
Wharton
Budget
Model,
Working
Paper
No.
2018-2,
2018),
https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/16/w2018-2
[https://perma.cc/6ZA46G4V]. The NIIT adds 3% (3.8% × (1 − 21%)) to the combined corporate-shareholder burden
(39.8%) and 3.8% to the maximum individual tax (40.8%), producing a negative tax wedge of 1%.
41. Halperin, supra note 39, at 1301 (“[T]he accumulated earnings on the reinvestment of [aftertax corporate income] are effectively never subject to individual rates. These earnings are taxed
only at the corporate level.”).
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shareholder-level tax).42 The shareholder-level tax levied on distribution
of the accumulated amounts is equal to the present value of the tax that
would be imposed if the original corporate earnings were distributed
currently (and the investment return on such earnings remains taxed
effectively only at 21%). As a result, the shareholder-level tax on
distribution does not compensate for the higher after-tax rate of return on
reinvested earnings.
To illustrate, assume that the corporate tax rate is 25%, the dividend
tax rate is 25%, and the individual tax rate is 43.75%; all investments earn
a 10% pretax return. Under these circumstances, the combined corporateshareholder tax burden (43.75%) is identical to the individual tax rate.43
If a pass-through business earned $100 and invested $56.25 after tax
($100 less $43.75 tax), the amount available for distribution would be
$62.75 at the end of two years, assuming an after-tax return of 5.625%
(10% × (1 − 43.75%)). Alternatively, if a corporate business earned $100
and invested $75 after tax ($100 less $25 tax), the amount available for
distribution would be $86.67 at the end of two years, assuming an aftertax return of 7.5% (10% × (1 − 25%)); the corporate accumulation would
be subject a 25% dividend tax, leaving the shareholders with $65. The
corporate advantage ($2.25) reflects the higher after-tax rate of return on
retained earnings undiminished by any shareholder-level tax.44
In the example, the initial corporate investment ($75) is higher than the
initial pass-through investment ($56.25). Since the combined corporateshareholder tax burden is $43.75, however, the effective corporate
investment is only $56.25 ($100 × (1 − 43.75%)), identical to the passthrough investment.45 If the pass-through investment earned the same
after-tax return (7.5%) as the corporate investment, the pass-through
accumulation would be identical to the corporate accumulation ($65) at
the end of two years.46 When the pass-through tax rate is lower than the
42. Daniel Halperin, Choice of Entity—A Conceptual Approach, 159 TAX NOTES 1601, 1603
(2018) (“[T]he benefit of the corporate form can be described as permanently taxing the return on
reinvested earnings at the 21 percent corporate rate whether or not they are later distributed . . . .”);
see also Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax
Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62 TAX LAW. 535, 546 (2009) (explaining that
deferral of the distribution results in the shareholder not paying taxes on the interim corporate
income).
43. The corporation would pay $25 tax on earnings of $100 and shareholders would pay $18.75
tax on the dividend of $75; the total tax equals $43.75.
44. The $2.25 difference between $62.75 and $65 reflects the advantage of investing $56.25 at
the higher return of 7.5% rather than 5.625% ($56.25 × [1.075 2 − 1.056252]).
45. If the shareholder-level tax were imposed immediately on the $100 of corporate earnings,
the corporation would be left with $56.25 to invest, the identical amount as the pass-through
investment. Nevertheless, the return on the corporate investment will eventually produce a larger
accumulation, since it is taxed only at 21%.
46. $56.25 × 1.0752 equals $65.
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combined corporate-shareholder tax rate—as under current law—the
corporate form may be either advantageous or disadvantageous,
depending on the pretax rate of return and the deferral period.47 Under
current law, the pass-through investment from $100 of earnings taxed at
29.6% ($70.40) is higher than the effective corporate investment from the
identical $100 of earnings ($60.20). Since reinvested corporate earnings
are taxed at a lower rate (21%), the corporate accumulation may
nevertheless eventually exceed the pass-through accumulation.48 By
contrast, despite the double tax burden, a corporate investment can never
fare worse than a noncorporate investment taxed at 40.8%.49
If pass-through parity were the goal, a more narrowly tailored solution
would be to set the tax rate on reinvested pass-through business income
equal to the tax rate on reinvested corporate earnings, rather than allowing
an arbitrary 20% deduction for pass-through income.50 Identifying the
return on reinvested capital eligible for the lower rate would undoubtedly
prove challenging, since the lower rate should not be available for
commingled service income. Leaving aside administrative difficulties,
such an approach would address directly the issue of “fairness” to passthrough owners by matching the actual benefit from the lower corporate
tax rate, namely, the ability to earn a higher after-tax rate of return on
reinvested earnings.51 Pass-through parity conflates fairness between
different entity forms with equitable distribution of the ultimate tax
burden among labor and capital.
III. SSTBS, PTPS AND REITS
A. Illusory Guardrails for Service Businesses
Despite the purported goal of distinguishing “labor income from
capital income in noncorporate businesses,”52 § 199A clearly falls short
47. Ignoring the 3.8% tax, the corporate form is never disadvantageous compared to the 37%
individual tax, since the combined corporate-shareholder rate is 36.8%.
48. See generally James R. Repetti, The Impact of the 2017 Act’s Tax Rate Changes on Choice
of Entity, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 686 (2018); Calvin H. Johnson, Choice of Entity by Reason of Tax
Rates, 158 TAX NOTES 1641 (2018).
49. See col. (4) (assuming a 37% maximum individual rate plus a 3.8% NIIT). The effective
corporate investment ($60.20) exceeds the effective pass-through investment ($59.20), and the
corporation earns a higher after-tax rate of return on the larger investment.
50. Halperin, supra note 39, at 1300 (“[W]e can provide equivalent treatment to pass-throughs
if we can identify earnings from the reinvestment of business profits and . . . limit the tax rate on
these earnings to no more than the corporate rate.”).
51. Id. (“[R]ecognizing the actual benefit of reducing corporate rates . . . suggests another
possible approach to fairness to pass-throughs.”)
52. See JCT, GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5, at 20 (“[W]hile the corporate tax is a tax
on capital income, the tax on income from noncorporate businesses may fall on both labor income
and capital income.”).
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of this goal. The 2017 Act provides a subsidy for most active passthrough owner-managers by taxing mixed labor and capital returns at
29.6%, while disallowing the 20% pass-through deduction in the case of
a specified service trade or business (SSTB).53 The SSTB exclusion was
purportedly intended to provide a “guardrail” in the case of laborintensive businesses.54 Assuming the SSTB restriction is fully applicable,
pass-through business income may be classified based on whether such
income is derived from a “tainted” service business and whether the
owner is active or passive, as shown below.
Individual Income Tax
37%

NIIT
0%

Combined Federal Tax
37%

Pass-through
non-SSTB
active owner

29.6%

0%

29.6%

Pass-through
non-SSTB
passive owner

29.6%

3.8%

33.4%

Pass-through
SSTB
active owner

A maximum 37% rate applies when pass-through income of an SSTB
is ineligible for the 20% deduction, encouraging SSTBs to switch to
corporate form.55 Below the taxable income threshold, § 199A allows a
deduction equal to 20% of qualified business income (QBI) even if the
business is an SSTB, reducing the incentive to incorporate.56 Above the
taxable income threshold, conversion provides access to the opportunity
to reinvest earnings at the lower corporate rate, undercutting the supposed
rationale for the guardrails. Corporate conversions are likely to be most
attractive when the SSTB or other § 199A constraints—including the
wage limit and wage-and-property limit—are binding.57 However, the
53. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2) (defining SSTB).
54. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 51 n.19 (“[T]he guardrails may have been directed more at
Congressional revenue estimators . . . than at the aim of creating strong impediments in practice.”).
55. The 2017 Act repealed the special rate for personal service corporations. See former I.R.C.
§ 11(b)(2) (2012) (imposing 35% rate on the taxable income of a qualified personal service
corporation (as defined in section 448(d)(2)).
56. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(3)(A), (d)(3).
57. Above the taxable income threshold ($315,000 for joint filers, and $157,500 for other filers),
the wage and wage-and-property limits are phased in over a specified range. I.R.C.
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generous threshold levels and other features of § 199A ensure that these
constraints are mostly illusory, preserving the pass-through advantage.
B. Converting PTPs to Corporate Status
Under § 7704, a publicly traded partnership (PTP) is classified as a
corporation unless it satisfies a 90% qualifying income exception.58
Congress could simply have required PTPs to convert to corporate status
to obtain the benefit of the 21% rate. Instead, § 199A allows a 20%
deduction for PTP income and qualified dividends from real estate
investment trusts (REITs), regardless of whether such income would
otherwise constitute qualifying business income.59 Recently, the
conversion of several publicly traded private equity firms from a
partnership structure (up-PTP) to a corporate structure (up-C) has
prompted speculation concerning a broader trend away from passthrough taxation.60 While the 21% corporate tax rate reduces the cost of
such PTP conversions, the switch is likely driven mainly by a desire to
enhance access to capital markets, broaden the investor base, and simplify
reporting.61
Even prior to the 2017 Act, the public PTP investors were subject to
corporate taxes on “nonqualifying” income flowing through blocker
corporations (inserted to meet the qualifying income exception under
§ 7704). Under the up-C structure, public investors will bear corporate
tax on their entire income share, rather than only a portion; nevertheless,
the postconversion basis step-up for the underlying assets will generate
deductions that reduce (or even eliminate) the corporate tax burden in the
early years.62 Since the operating partnerships in these structures
generally remain pass-through entities,63 the conversion at the top level
of the structure affects only the public investors whose interests are now
held through a C corporation rather than a partnership. Following the
§ 199A(b)(2)(3), (d)(3), (e)(2). Once these limits are fully phased in, no § 199A deduction is
allowed for an SSTB. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3).
58. See I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (requiring that 90% or more of a PTP’s gross income consist of
qualifying income).
59. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(1). In the case of REITs, the § 199A deduction generally applies to any
dividends paid by the REIT other than qualified capital gain dividends and ordinary dividends taxed
at capital gain rates. Id. § 199A(e)(3).
60. PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL, supra note 24 (citing KKR and Ares conversions from
PTPs to C corporations).
61. Peter F. G. Schuur, Choice of Entity Considerations After the TCJA, TAXES: THE TAX
MAG., Mar. 2019, at 141–42.
62. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201906002 (Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing the § 743(b) basis
adjustment).
63. See Eric Yauch, Passthrough Basis Step-Up Still Drives Private Equity Planning, 163 TAX
NOTES 892, 893 (2019) (quoting Clifford Warren, who stated that such conversions affected just
the “top level for investors”).
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conversion, the founders typically continue to own their interests through
a pass-through entity, unburdened by the corporate tax.64
Unlike PTPs, nonpublicly traded private equity firms do not benefit
from converting to corporate status. In 2017, Congress enacted § 1061,
imposing a three-year holding period for long-term capital gain
attributable to “applicable partnership interests.”65 Otherwise, the 2017
Act leaves largely intact the tax treatment for “carried” interests received
in exchange for services. As a result, private equity professionals will
continue to have an incentive to use pass-through vehicles to convert
ordinary income into capital gain. Structuring investment management
companies as partnerships or S corporations serves to further limit
employment taxes.66 Although investment management is an SSTB,
converting management companies to C status is unlikely to be attractive.
If most of the firm’s income consists of long-term capital gain (taxed at
23.8%), the advantage from reinvesting earnings at the corporate rate
(21%) is small. Moreover, conversion is a one-way street that would
potentially expose gain on assets such as appreciated goodwill to double
taxation if the corporation is later unwound.67
C. Extending § 199A Benefit to REITs (and RICs)
Like PTPs, REITs are also eligible for an unrestricted 20% deduction
for qualifying income.68 Although the 2017 Act may encourage REITs to
convert to corporate status to benefit from the 21% rate,69 such
64. Cf. Emily L. Foster, Carlyle’s ‘Full C Corp’ Conversion Differs from Others, 164 TAX
NOTES 920, 920 (2019) (“[T]he partnerships that have converted . . . expect to pay more income
taxes as corporations than they would have as partnerships, but the investor benefits outweigh the
additional tax cost.”).
65. I.R.C. § 1061. Because § 1061 does not apply to a partnership interest held by a corporation,
it was initially unclear whether this exception applied to S corporations. See I.R.S. Notice 2018-18,
2018-12 I.R.B. 443 (indicating that future regulations would exclude S corporations from the term
“corporation” for purposes of § 1061(c)(4)(A)). The Treasury recently issued proposed regulations
under § 1061. See Guidance Under Section 1061, REG-107213-18, 85 Fed. Reg. 49,754 (August
14, 2020).
66. Burke, supra note 25, at 588–89 (illustrating use of S corporation to block employment
taxes); see Dagres v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 263, 268 (2011) (describing the structure of investment
partnership with blocker S corporation).
67. Schuur, supra note 61, at 141.
68. The special rule for REITs was presumably added to ensure that the § 199A deduction
would be allowed even though REITs do not pay W-2 wages. See Karen C. Burke, Section 199A
and Choice of Passthrough Entity, 72 TAX LAW. 551, 566 (2018) (“The unstated purpose of the
wage-and-property limit was to allow rental real estate owners to benefit fully from the section
199A deduction even if they paid no W-2 wages.”). A REIT is generally restricted to earning certain
types of passive income and must also meet certain distribution requirements. I.R.C. §§ 856–57.
69. See Gillian Tan, Under New Tax Law the Question Is, To Be or Not to Be a REIT?,
BLOOMBERG L. DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-04-25/under-new-tax-law-the-question-is-to-be-or-not-to-be-a-reit
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conversions seem unlikely given the tax-advantaged status of REITs
under the current rules. Indeed, the 2017 Act is likely to fuel further
expansion of REITs, since the § 199A deduction is available even for
income earned indirectly through a REIT that would not qualify if earned
directly by the REIT shareholders. Thus, inserting a REIT into a passthrough structure has the potential to convert nonqualifying income—
such as income not derived from a trade or business, non-U.S. trade-orbusiness income, and income derived from an SSTB—into income
eligible for the § 199A deduction.70 Nevertheless, foreign and tax-exempt
investors tend to view REITs as risky because of the potential default to
corporate status if REIT requirements are not satisfied.71
Recently, the U.S. Department of the Treasury extended the § 199A
deduction to dividends paid by a regulated investment company (RIC) to
the extent that the RIC receives dividends from one or more REITs.72
Normally, a RIC would not be entitled to any § 199A deduction, since it
is a corporation; under “conduit” treatment a RIC may pay dividends that
a mutual fund investor treats in the same manner (or a similar manner) as
if the underlying item of income or gain were realized directly by the
investor.73 Although the 2017 legislative history contemplated that RIC
dividends attributable to qualifying REIT dividends would be eligible for
the § 199A deduction, the statutory language was unclear.74 The § 199A
deduction for RIC dividends attributable to REIT dividends could be
viewed as simply eliminating a distortion “whereby direct ownership of
REITs is tax-advantaged relative to indirect ownership of REITs through
RICs.”75 Given the failure of Congress to explain the rationale for
[https://perma.cc/Q863-ACG5] (speculating that conversion might be attractive to REITs that seek
to retain capital to finance expansion or other business needs rather than pay out dividends to REIT
investors).
70. Stephen Giordano & Ryan Taylor, Section 199A, REITs, and Real Estate Funds: A Janus
Face of Tax Reform, 161 TAX NOTES 941, 942 (2018).
71. See id. at 943–44. (“Both foreign and tax-exempt investors may view a REIT as a source of
potential risk even if the use of the REIT would not, when used properly, result in an operational
or tax inefficiency to investors.”).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(d). Generally, the § 199A dividends reported by a RIC for the
taxable year may not exceed REIT dividends received less allocable expenses. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.199A-3(d)(2)(ii); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(d)(4)(ii) (holding period requirement).
73. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 852(b)(3) (explaining shareholder treatment of capital gain dividends);
Qualified Business Income Deduction, REG-134652-18, Preamble, 84 Fed. Reg. 3,015, 3,016 (Feb.
8, 2019) [hereinafter Preamble to REG-134652-18] (“These proposed regulations provide rules
under which a RIC that receives qualified REIT dividends may pay section 199A dividends.”).
74. See JCT, GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5, at 29–30 (discussing qualifying REIT
dividends); see also Preamble to REG-134652-18, supra note 73, at 3,015 (justifying special RIC
treatment under Treasury’s authority to prescribe regulations “necessary to carry out the purposes
of section 199A” with respect to tiered entities).
75. Preamble to REG-134652-18, supra note 73, at 3,020. Conduit treatment of qualified PTP
income received by RICs raises “several novel issues.” Id. at 3,017 (reserving on this issue).
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favorable treatment of REITs in the first place,76 however, extending the
§ 199A benefit to RICs arguably merely compounds the problem.
IV. CORPORATE VS. PASS-THROUGH ENTITY CHOICE
Although § 199A was justified as a measure to maintain
competitiveness between pass-throughs and C corporations, the reduced
corporate tax rate is unlikely to significantly alter choice of organizational
form, at least in the short run.77 The portion of business income taxed
under the individual income tax has increased greatly since 1986; by
2016, pass-throughs reported over half of all business income.78 Given
the uncertainty concerning the durability of the 2017 Act and the high tax
cost of exiting a C corporation, business owners may be cautious about
converting from pass-through to corporate form. Choice of entity is likely
to be driven at the margin by particular facts and circumstances.79 To the
extent that particular types of businesses are excluded from the benefits
of § 199A, corporations will provide an attractive alternative,
notwithstanding a potential second level of tax when earnings are
withdrawn. Other features of pass-through treatment—including the
ability to step-up asset basis at the cost of only a single level of tax—will
likely continue to render such entities more tax efficient than C
corporations, particularly upon sale or other disposition of a business.
A. Ordinary Business Profits and Unrealized Appreciation
When individual income is taxed at an average rate below 21%, passthrough treatment produces the better result, even if there is no tax on
corporate distributions.80 Likewise, the corporate form generally offers
76. See GREENBERG & KAEDING, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that Congress’s reasons for
exempting REITs and PTPs from the limits under § 199A are not clear).
77. See Erin Henry et al., Tax Policy and Organizational Form: Assessing the Effects of the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 635, 655–56 (2018) (“[O]rganizational form decisions
following [the 2017 Act] will be significantly more nuanced than those following the [1986 Act].”);
id. at 657 (“[T]he net effect on organizational form in the aggregate is not likely to be as large as
those caused by the TRA86.”). The tax burden of investing in a C corporation (as compared to a
pass-through entity) depends on (1) the statutory corporate and individual tax rates, (2) the tax rates
for dividends and capital gains, (3) the dividend payout rate, and (4) the capital gains realization
rate. See Plesko & Toder, supra note 2, at 863–64.
78. Cooper et al., supra note 15, at 91. In 2016, there were about 4.6 million S corporations, 3.8
million partnerships (including LLCs), and 1.6 million C corporations. GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN
C. BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 22 (4th ed. 2020) (graphing the number of partnerships, C
corporations, and S corporations from 1980 through 2016).
79. See Henry et al., supra note 77, at 656 (“[T]here is no ‘one size fits all’ approach for a
particular organizational form in the post-TCJA era.”); see generally Bradley T. Borden, IncomeBased Effective Tax Rates and Choice-Of-Entity Considerations Under the 2017 Tax Act, 71 NAT’L
TAX J. 613 (2018).
80. In this situation, splitting the business between a pass-through and a C corporation might
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only a relatively small advantage in the case of portfolio investments
taxed at 23.8% if held individually.81 Since the corporate tax effectively
substitutes for the individual tax on portfolio investments, the benefit to
wealthy individuals from stuffing corporations with portfolio investments
is thus constrained.82 An increasingly large percentage of pass-through
income is taxed at preferential capital gains rates, reducing the benefit of
conversion.83
The “strongest case” for the corporate advantage is when business
profits (taxed as ordinary income) are reinvested in the business for a
lengthy period.84 Indeed, the spread between the low corporate rate and
the higher pass-through rate on ordinary business profits “has been
offered as a major driver for a shift to the corporate form.”85 Unlike
portfolio income taxed at roughly the same rates both inside and outside
the corporation, the corporate rate on reinvested ordinary business profits
is significantly below the pass-through rate. Even when § 199A is fully
applicable, the tax gap is 8.6 percentage points (29.6% versus 21%).
Upon closer inspection, however, even the strongest case for the
corporate advantage proves surprisingly weak.
To illustrate, assume that a corporation with invested capital of
$1,000,000 earns $100,000 annually; all earnings are fully taxable as
ordinary income, subject to the 21% corporate rate, and are reinvested in
the business for 30 years at a pretax rate of 10%. At the end of Year 30,
the accumulated after-tax amount is distributed to shareholders, subject
to a 23.8% tax. Alternatively, assume that a pass-through is used for the
identical investment, the NIIT does not apply, and all ordinary business
profits are taxed directly to the individual owners at 29.6%. The passthrough makes annual tax-free distributions sufficient to cover the ownerlevel taxes and reinvests all after-tax profits for 30 years.86 At the end of
nevertheless save taxes. See Halperin, supra note 42, at 1602 n.7 (suggesting that, in certain income
ranges, “tax could be reduced by splitting the business between a C corporation and a pass-through
so that all income is taxed at 21 percent or lower”).
81. See Knoll I, supra note 7, at 982–84 (noting that for pass-through entities, there is no further
tax); Knoll II, supra note 7, at 1451–53 (describing the effect of the 3.8% Medicare tax). The
dividends-received deduction under § 243 may reduce the tax rate on intercorporate qualified
dividends to 10.5%. See I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).
82. Knoll I, supra note 7, at 985 (explaining that use of the corporate form does not reduce the
tax burden on portfolio income).
83. See Cooper et al., supra note 15, at 115 (“Nearly half of partnership income allocated to
taxable entities accrues in the form of tax preferred capital gains and dividends.”); see also PENN
WHARTON BUDGET MODEL, supra note 24 (noting that “both capital gains and qualified dividends
already face the lowest possible rate if received through a pass-through business”).
84. Knoll II, supra note 7, at 1456–57.
85. Id. at 1454.
86. The annual tax distributions reduce outside basis but do not trigger gain recognition. I.R.C.
§§ 705, 731. The owners’ outside bases are increased to reflect their taxable share of income less
tax distributions, preserving equality between inside and outside bases.
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Year 30, the corporate after-tax return ($8,786,859)87 exceeds the passthrough after-tax return ($6,698,091)88 before any distribution to
shareholders; once shareholder-level taxes are taken into account,
however, the pass-through is clearly superior.89 Since distributions of
previously taxed income are tax free, pass-through owners enjoy higher
net consumption.90 Indeed, the crossover point for the corporate and passthrough investments is 30.057 years, after which point the corporate form
becomes more advantageous.91 Given the current rate instability,
however, a thirty-year deferral strategy would be exceedingly risky.
Assuming full retention, the crossover point depends on the
relationship between the corporate and pass-through tax rates, the pretax
rate of return, and the length of deferral. A corporate investment may
easily overtake a pass-through investment taxed at the highest individual
rate (37%), notwithstanding the burden of the double tax. Ignoring the
NIIT, the crossover point is reached more quickly because the corporate
after-tax rate of return on reinvested earnings is higher relative to the
pass-through after-tax rate of return. The 37% rate is likely to apply,
however, only if the pass-through business is an SSTB, in which case the
SSTB would convert to corporate status. For purposes of assessing the
corporate advantage (or disadvantage), the weakness of the § 199A
constraints suggests that 29.6% is the most relevant rate for pass-through
income. Moreover, there is ample evidence to support the assumption that

87. At a 7.9% after-tax return (10% × (1 − 21%)), the initial investment grows to $9,786,859
(1,000,000 × 1.07930); the corporate after-tax return is $8,786,859 ($9,786,859 less $1,000,000
initial investment).
88. At a 7.04% after-tax return (10% × (1 − 29.6%)), the initial investment grows to $7,698,091
($1,000,000 × 1.070430); the pass-through after-tax return is $6,698,091 ($7,698,091 less
$1,000,000 initial investment).
89.
Ordinary Income Taxed Currently (30 Years at 10% Pretax)
Cumulative after-tax Owner-level tax on Owner net
return (1)
net distribution (2)
consumption (3)
C Corporation
$8,786,859
$2,091,272
$6,695,587
Pass-through
$6,698,091
0
$6,698,091
(full § 199A; no NIIT)
90. After payment of the shareholder level tax of $2,261,958, the shareholders are left with net
consumption of $6,695,587 ($8,786,859 × (1 − 23.8%)), or $2,504 less than the pass-through
owners’ net consumption ($6,698,091).
91. The following equation can be used to calculate the crossover point:
0.762 × [($1,000,000 × 1.079t) − $1,000,000)] = ($1,000,000 × 1.0704t) − $1,000,000,
where
0.762 represents the corporate distribution reduced by the shareholder-level tax (1 − 23.8%), 1.079t
represents the after-tax corporate return on reinvested earnings for t years, and 1.0704t equals the
after-tax pass-through return on reinvested earnings for t years. See Repetti, supra note 48, at 706
n.54 (deriving the equation). To determine the net accumulation, the initial investment of
$1,000,000 must be backed out.
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aggressive use of the S corporation loophole and limited partner
exception allows high-income active pass-through owners to successfully
avoid nearly all of the 3.8% taxes under FICA, SECA, and § 1411.92
Alternatively, a business may plow back after-tax ordinary business
income into an asset that accrues unrealized gain (potentially taxable at
capital gain rates) and is subsequently sold. To illustrate, assume that a
corporation (or pass-through entity) with invested capital of $1,000,000
earns $100,000 annually and reinvests its after-tax earnings for 20 years
at a pretax rate of 10% in an appreciating capital asset. At the end of Year
20, the appreciated asset is sold, and the net proceeds are distributed after
payment of any entity-level tax. The appreciated value of the corporate
asset ($4,524,725)93 exceeds that of the pass-through asset
($4,032,160)94 before any distributions to shareholders. Even when
accrued appreciation is taxed entirely at ordinary income rates, however,
the pass-through investment is significantly more advantageous than the
corporate investment.95 The amount available for shareholder-level
consumption is reduced by (1) the corporate tax on the accrued
appreciation and (2) the shareholder-level tax on the entire amount
distributed (less corporate-level taxes and return of the shareholders’
initial investment).96 By contrast, the pass-through return on the initial
investment and the unrealized appreciation is taxed only once, leaving

92. Owners may be active for purposes of § 1411 but still take advantage of the limited partner
exception. I.R.C. §§ 1402(a)(13), 1411.
93. The appreciated value of the corporate asset is $4,524,725 ($79,000 annual
payments × 1.1020), i.e., the cumulative after-tax cash invested in the asset ($1,580,000) plus the
accrued appreciation ($2,944,725).
94. The appreciated value of the pass-through asset is $4,032,160 ($70,400 annual
payments × 1.1020), i.e., the cumulative after-tax cash invested in the asset ($1,408,000) plus the
accrued appreciation ($2,624,160).
95.
Investment with Unrealized Appreciation (20 Years at 10% Pretax)

C
corporation
Pass-through
(full § 199A;
no NIIT)

Cumulative
after-tax cash
(1)
$1,580,000

Cumulative
appreciation
(2)
$2,944,725

Entity-level tax
on appreciation
(3)
$618,392

Ownerlevel tax
(4)
$929,707

Owner net
consumption
(5)
$2,976,625

$1,408,000

$2,624,160

0

$776,751

$3,255,409

96. The corporate-level tax equals $618,392 (21% × $2,944,725 appreciation) and the
shareholder-level tax equals $553,667 (23.8% × 79% × $2,944,725 appreciation) plus $376,040
(23.8% × $1,580,000 cumulative after-tax cash). The net shareholder consumption equals
$2,976,625 ($4,524,725 less combined taxes of $1,548,099).
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the pass-through owners with higher net consumption.97
If the accrued appreciation is taxed at preferential capital gain rates,
the pass-through advantage is even greater. Although the § 199A
deduction is not available, the pass-through advantage is magnified
because (1) individual capital gains are taxed at a lower rate (20%) than
the corporate rate (21%), (2) active pass-through owners may avoid the
3.8% NIIT on pass-through income (including gain from sale of assets or
interests), and (3) the corporate advantage from taxing ordinary business
profits at a lower rate is attenuated when after-tax profits are reinvested
in assets accruing unrealized appreciation. The corporate disadvantage
could be eliminated by electing S corporation status and waiting five
years to sell the former C corporation’s assets, thereby avoiding the builtin gain tax under § 1374.98 Although conversion to S status thus
potentially eliminates the second level of tax on sale of corporate assets,
the five-year waiting period is unlikely to be attractive given the
precariousness of the 2017 legislation.
Exempting all business income from taxation would level the organizational playing field. While taxing business profits at a zero rate may
seem extreme, the 2017 Act expanded § 168(k) to allow expensing of
both new and used business assets.99 Of course, not all assets are eligible
for expensing—for example, most real property does not qualify and intangibles continue to be amortized over a fifteen-year period.100 Immediate expensing is equivalent to exempting from taxation the normal return
to an investment (assuming constant tax rates).101 If expensing applied
uniformly to all capital investments (and were permanent), there would
be no tax incentive to structure a business as a corporation rather than a
pass-through, even if the investment produced ordinary income.102 Nevertheless, § 168(k) expensing applies unevenly to business investments
and is slated to expire in 2023. Moreover, even if the normal return were
exempt, the supranormal return would remain fully taxable. To the extent
that unrealized appreciation in business assets (such as goodwill)

97. The net pass-through consumption equals $3,255,409 ($1,408,000 previously taxed income
plus 70.4% × $2,624,160 appreciation), or $278,784 more than the net shareholder consumption.
98. See I.R.C. § 1374(a), (d)(7) (imposing the five-year waiting period).
99. Id. § 168(k).
100. Id. § 168(k)(2) (qualified property).
101. See Knoll II, supra note 7, at 1457 (noting that immediate deduction of the full amount
invested is equivalent to exempting the return on that investment); Glogower & Kamin, supra note
7, at 514 (noting that the first-year deduction “offsets the future tax liability as the investment
generates taxable income”). Of course, the assumption of constant tax rates is unlikely to hold,
given the instability of the current corporate rate.
102. Knoll II, supra note 7, at 1457 (“Accordingly, for there to be a tax benefit from
incorporating, the reinvested expenditures cannot be immediately deductible.”).
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represents disproportionately supranormal returns, the pass-through form
would again be favored.
B. Higher Disposition Cost of Corporate Business
Even if a business owner plans to retain and reinvest all earnings in a
C corporation, disposition of a corporate business generally entails a
higher tax cost compared to a pass-through business. While a deceased
shareholder’s stock basis is stepped up to fair market value under § 1014,
any unrealized gain lurking in the corporation’s assets is preserved for
subsequent taxation. On a stock sale, the buyer will discount the purchase
price to reflect the lack of a stepped-up basis in corporate assets.103 By
contrast, an asset sale allows a stepped-up basis for corporate assets at the
cost of only a corporate-level tax, but a subsequent distribution will
trigger a shareholder-level tax.104
When sale of qualified small business stock (QSBS) is eligible for the
100% gain exclusion under § 1202, disposition of a corporate business is
treated more favorably.105 Exclusion of the seller’s stock gain potentially
compensates for lack of an inside basis step-up. Moreover, excluded gain
is not subject to the NIIT.106 Under current law, a liquidating sale of
QSBS assets—coupled with a tax-free deemed sale of QSBS stock—is
subject only to a 21% corporate-level tax (rather than a 35% tax under
prior law).107 Such an asset acquisition may offer the best of all options—
an asset basis step-up for the purchaser and full gain exclusion for the
seller on the deemed stock sale.108 Nevertheless, these considerations
underscore the downside of the corporate form generally—the lack of an
inside basis step-up upon sale or other disposition of an owner’s
interest—compared to the pass-through form. Moreover, the QSBS
exclusion is subject to numerous limitations—and the § 1202 definition
of a qualified trade or business generally precludes SSTBs from
qualifying.109 Thus, § 1202 is unlikely to provide much incentive to
103. The buyer should take into account both the present value of lower expected depreciation
deductions and higher gain resulting from a lower basis upon disposition.
104. I.R.C. §§ 338(h)(10), 336(e) (stock sale treated as asset sale).
105. I.R.C. § 1202(a), (b)(1). Under § 1202(b)(1), the excludible gain is limited to the greater
of $10 million or 10 times the adjusted basis of the stock. For 2019, the estimated revenue cost of
§ 1202 ranges between $1.1 billion and $1.3 billion. Manoj Viswanathan, The Qualified Small
Business Stock Exclusion: How Startup Shareholders Get $10 Million (Or More) Tax-Free, 120
COLUM. L. REV. F. 29, 32 (2020).
106. See I.R.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii) (limiting the 3.8% tax to net taxable gain); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1411-4(d)(3) (example 3). By contrast, gain on an individual shareholder’s sale of corporate
stock will generally be subject to the NIIT.
107. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336.
108. Thomas Lenz & Ben Wasmuth, A New Twist on an Old Battle: Basis Step-Up or 100%
QSBS Gain Exclusion—or Both?, 21 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 31, 34 (2018).
109. See I.R.C. § 1202(c)(2), (e)(3) (specifying the qualifications).

2021]

The Spurious Allure of Pass-Through Parity

373

convert existing pass-through businesses to corporate form.110
C. Partnership Inside Basis Step-Up
Upon the death of a partner, a § 743(b) adjustment steps up to fair
market value the successor’s outside basis and proportionate share of the
partnership’s common basis.111 Even though the deceased partner’s gross
estate includes only the deathtime fair market value of the partnership
interest (net of liabilities), the successor takes an outside basis equal to
the estate tax value increased by the successor’s share of partnership
liabilities.112 The inclusion of liabilities in the successor’s outside basis
is necessary to provide a full “cost” basis in the assets. By contrast, the
basis of a deceased S corporation shareholder’s stock is stepped up (or
down) to fair market value under § 1014, but the inside basis of the S
corporation’s assets remains unchanged.113 Similarly, there is generally
no way to step up the basis of the S corporation’s assets for the benefit of
a purchaser who acquires S stock, unless the parties agree to treat the
stock sale as an asset acquisition under § 338.114 In this situation, gain on
the deemed asset sale flows through to the selling S corporation
shareholders whose stock basis is increased immediately before any
liquidating distribution.
Indeed, the ease of stepping up inside basis with only a single level of
tax represents one of the primary benefits of operating in partnership
form. Such an inside basis step-up will often be crucial because an
unrelated acquiror may be able to expense the purchase price of assets
qualifying under § 168(k). Under the 2017 Act, immediate expensing
enhances the tax benefit derived from an inside basis step-up, while lower
rates diminish the tax benefit. Upon acquisition of a partnership interest,
an unrelated transferee is entitled to expense immediately any positive
§ 743 adjustment with respect to the transferee’s share of eligible
partnership property.115 An existing partner who purchases an additional
interest is viewed as acquiring a portion of the partnership’s assets not
110. Knoll II, supra note 7, at 1454 (concluding that the “impact on incorporations is probably
modest”).
111. I.R.C. § 743(b).
112. But see I.R.C. § 753 (excluding income in respect of a decedent (IRD) items).
113. Although an S corporation is generally treated as a separate entity, a look-through rule
applies to IRD items. See I.R.C. § 1367(b) (denying a § 1014 basis step-up to the extent the value
of a deceased shareholder’s stock is attributable to IRD items).
114. The equivalent of an inside-basis step-up (at the cost of a single shareholder-level tax) is
possible, however, if § 338(h)(10) or § 336(e) applies to a qualified stock purchase or disposition
of S corporation stock. See I.R.C. §§ 338(h)(10) (treating certain stock sales as asset sales), 336(e)
(treating certain stock sales and distributions as asset transfers); but see I.R.C. § 1374 (imposing
built-in gain tax).
115. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.168(k)-2(b)(3)(iv)(D), 1.743-1(j)(4)(i)(B)(1) (treating increased
portion of asset basis as newly purchased property).
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previously owned by such partner; thus, an existing partner who
purchases another partner’s interest may also be eligible to expense a
positive § 743(b) adjustment.116
The ability to step up asset basis with a single-level tax helps to explain
why partnerships are likely to remain “king” in sophisticated tax
planning.117 Although it is still too early to predict, partnerships will most
likely continue to be used for essentially the same planning purposes as
under pre-2017 law. Partnerships continue to offer unrivaled benefits in
terms of loss pass-through and tax-advantaged allocations, while
preserving flexible classification when the corporate rate increases in the
future.118 Moreover, if the buyer wishes to acquire some (but not all) of
a business, partnerships generally offer greater flexibility for structuring
a tax-efficient exit strategy.
V. CLOSE CORPORATIONS, PASS-THROUGHS, AND EMPLOYMENT TAX
GAPS
Regardless of organizational form, the 2017 Act offers active ownermanagers of closely held C corporations and pass-through entities novel
incentives to mischaracterize labor income as lower-taxed business
income. In the guise of taxing corporate and noncorporate capital income
more alike, § 199A further exacerbates existing disparities in the taxation
of capital and labor income.119 Prior to the 2017 Act, high-income active
pass-through owners typically sought to exploit employment tax
loopholes to avoid the 3.8% Medicare tax.120 Rather than address these
well-known loopholes, the 2017 Act encourages active owner-managers
to relabel compensation as business income, thereby reducing both
income and employment taxes. Indeed, the 2017 Act extends the S
corporation employment tax loophole to closely held C corporations,
while providing an incentive to prefer partnerships over S corporations to
maximize the § 199A deduction. These perverse incentives pose a
fundamental challenge to long-standing rules concerning reasonable
compensation.
116. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.168(k)-2(b)(3)(iv)(D), 1.743-1(j)(4)(i)(B)(1) (applying aggregate
approach).
117. Yauch, supra note 63, at 892 (“[P]assthroughs continue to be king in terms of planning.”).
118. I.R.C. § 704(b), (d). See generally Stephan Utz, Substantiality of QBI Allocations Under
Subchapter K, 162 TAX NOTES 55 (2019).
119. Prior to the 2017 Act, the “carried interest” strategy and the S corporation loophole
arguably represented the two most egregious examples of labor income disguised as capital income.
See Kleinbard, supra note 31, at 60 (“Two instances where the distinction between labor and capital
income does matter today . . . are the well-known carried interest debates [and] the ‘John Edwards’
payroll tax avoidance gambit . . . .”).
120. Burke, supra note 25, at 579 (noting incentive for high-income owner-managers to opt out
of the system of mandatory contributions for social insurance).
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A. Closely Held C Corporations
Prior to the 2017 Act, it was generally advantageous for a corporation
to pay compensation rather than dividends to owner-managers, thereby
mitigating the double tax burden. In the case of closely held C
corporations, high-income owner-managers benefited from graduated
corporate tax rates and had an incentive to distribute excess corporate
profits as deductible compensation rather than nondeductible dividends
taxed as ordinary income.121 The preferential rate for qualified dividends,
introduced in 2003, reduced the relative disadvantage of paying dividends
in comparison to compensation.122 Nevertheless, paying compensation
generally remained more tax-efficient than paying dividends at higher
income levels.123
As in the case of sheltering capital investments, retention and
reinvestment of compensation-flavored income permits an ownermanager to benefit from a higher rate of return on after-tax amounts
reinvested in the corporation. Unlike in the partnership context, however,
understating compensation does “not . . . convert labor income to [lower
taxed] capital income . . . in the first instance . . . .”124 The 2017 Act
decisively shifts the balance in favor of paying dividends rather than
compensation.125 Indeed, the flat 21% corporate rate gives rise to a
preference for dividends over compensation “at almost all levels of
corporate income.”126 The relative advantage of dividends versus
compensation declines somewhat at higher income levels because
(1) FICA taxes do not apply above the Social Security cap and (2) both
the 3.8% NIIT and 20% dividend rate come into play.127 At lower income
121. The benefit of the low corporate income tax rates was clawed back by a 5% additional tax
between $100,000 and $335,000 of corporate income, resulting in a flat rate of 34%. I.R.C. § 11(b)
(2012), amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, § 13001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2096
(2017). The 2017 Act abolished the graduated corporate tax rates. Id.
122. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (taxing qualified dividends as net capital gain).
123. See Bob G. Kilpatrick & Dennis R. Lassila, Compensation vs. Qualified Dividends for
Shareholder-Employees After the TCJA, J. TAX’N 6, 6 (2018) (noting the preference for
corporations to pay compensation before 2003); see also David J. Roberts, Undercompensated
Shareholder-Employees and the New Rate Structure, 162 TAX NOTES 165, 170 (2019) (noting that
the historical tax rate structure was biased against paying dividends to owner-managers).
124. See Kleinbard, supra note 31, at 46–47.
125. See Kilpatrick & Lassila, supra note 123, at 7 (“[The TCJA] substantially altered the
playing field . . . when it comes to deciding whether to pay compensation or dividends to
shareholder-employees . . . .”); see also Donald T. Williamson, Peter Rivera & A. Blair Staley,
Optimizing Salary/Dividends of a C Corporation After TCJA, 158 TAX NOTES 1335, 1335 (2018)
(noting that the 2017 Act changes “will require all small businesses, including C corporations with
a single shareholder-employee, to reconsider the most tax-efficient mix of salary and dividends”).
126. Williamson, Rivera & Staley, supra note 125, at 1342.
127. Taxpayers with taxable income above $425,800 ($479,000 joint return) face a 20%
dividend tax. See I.R.C. § 1(j)(5)(B)(ii)(I), (III) (modifying I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C)(ii)(I)) (adjusted for
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levels, dividends are extremely attractive because they are not subject to
employment taxes and the first $38,600 is taxed at a marginal rate of zero;
these factors outweigh the loss of a 21% corporate-level deduction for
compensation.128
For a closely held business, the decision whether to pay compensation
or dividends depends on the combined tax burden of entity-level and
individual income taxes, employment taxes, and the NIIT.129 Because
most small C corporations closely resemble S corporations with few
shareholders, active owner-managers can effectively minimize taxes by
controlling the form of distributions.130 The failure to exclude closely
held businesses from the flat 21% corporate rate compounds the problem
of sheltering labor income within C corporations. The corporate penalty
taxes—the personal holding company tax and accumulated earnings
tax—have proven “notoriously ineffective” against use of corporations to
shelter accumulated earnings from the individual income tax.131 When,
as under current law (ignoring the NIIT), the combined corporateshareholder rate (36.8%) is lower than the maximum individual rate
(37%), sheltering labor income within a C corporation is always
advantageous: this strategy saves income taxes, even without taking
employment taxes into account.
If a corporation distributes earnings as salary to high-income active
owner-managers, the top marginal tax rate is roughly 40.2% (taking into
account the deductibility of the employer half of the Medicare tax), or
slightly more than the combined corporate-shareholder burden of 39.8%

inflation by I.R.C. § 1(j)(5)(C)) (“The maximum 15-percent rate amount shall be—in the case of a
joint return or surviving spouse, $479,000 . . . [and] in the case of any other individual . . . ,
$425,800 . . . .”); see also I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (effectively capping the dividend rate at 20%).
128. See I.R.C. § 1(j)(5)(B)(i)(I), (III) (specifying the maximum zero rate amount). For 2020,
the Social Security wage limit is $137,700. Contribution and Benefit Base, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html [https://perma.cc/WXF4-MY24] (last visited Sept. 19,
2020).
129. Under the 21% rate, the corporate tax savings reduce the net burden of the employer share
of FICA taxes to 4.9% (6.2% − 1.3%) and the employer share of Medicare taxes to 1.15%
(1.45% − 0.3%).
130. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY: PRESENT LAW AND DATA
RELATING TO C CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND S CORPORATIONS (JCX-71-15) 22–23
(Apr. 10, 2015) (noting that, while about 45% of C corporations report assets under $50,000,
roughly 50% of S corporations and 40% of partnerships also report assets under $50,000). In 2016,
all S corporations averaged fewer than two shareholders per firm. See Table 7: Returns of Active
Corporations,
Form
1120S,
Tax
Year
2016,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16co07ccr.xlsx [https://perma.cc/7Z2Z-BQZR] (last visited Nov.
17, 2020) (dividing Number of shareholders for All industries (7,434,479) by Number of returns
for All industries (4,592,042) yielding an average of 1.6 shareholders per S corporation return);
YIN & BURKE, supra note 78, at 26.
131. Schler, supra note 17, at 1733. See I.R.C. §§ 531–537, 541–547 (imposing accumulated
earnings tax and personal holding company tax).
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if earnings are distributed as dividends.132 Given the relatively small
difference in the combined tax burden (40.2% versus 39.8%), the new
rate environment arguably renders the reasonable compensation standard
moot for high-income owner-managers of C corporations. When ownermanagers’ wage income exceeds the Social Security cap, the dividend
strategy may have only a minimal impact on employment taxes, since the
3.8% tax cannot be avoided on dividend distributions.133 Below the
Social Security cap, however, the dividend strategy allows ownermanagers to reduce both income and employment taxes, thereby further
eroding the Social Security system. The experience with S corporation
owner-managers augurs poorly for the IRS’s ability to combat such tax
avoidance.
B. S Corporation Loophole and § 199A
While the § 199A deduction provides an incentive to operate a
business in pass-through form, the paramount issue concerns which type
of pass-through entity is likely to be most tax efficient. Prior to the 2017
Act, S corporations were often viewed as the default entity, given the
ability of active owner-managers to avoid FICA taxes, subject to a
difficult-to-enforce constraint to pay reasonable compensation.134
Section 1402(a)(13) allows limited partners to escape SECA taxes, but
only if the entity is formed as a state law limited partnership, not an
LLC.135 High-income owner-managers could also avoid the 3.8% tax
under § 1411, thereby exempting the pass-through income from all of the
3.8% taxes.136 These techniques reduced employment taxes but did not
save income taxes, since only the character of the owner-managers’
distributive share was affected. By contrast, under current law, the goal
is to structure a pass-through business to maximize the § 199A deduction

132. See supra notes 20 (taking into account the NIIT, the combined corporate-shareholder rate
equals 39.8%) and 32 (taking into account deductibility of employer’s half of Medicare taxes, the
top marginal rate on wages equals about 40.2%).
133. Since the 6.2% payroll tax rate applies only up to the Social Security cap, the effective rate
approaches zero for high earners. Henry et al., supra note 77, at 647 n.18 (explaining why the model
ignores the Social Security tax at high income levels).
134. David R. Sicular, Subchapter S at 55—Has Time Passed This Passthrough By? Maybe
Not, 68 TAX LAW. 185, 187, 211 (2015) (noting that owner-managers of S corporations do not pay
self-employment taxes and can minimize payroll taxes by paying minimal compensation).
135. See Burke, supra note 25, at 578 (“[T]he emergence of LLCs . . . created uncertainty
concerning the meaning of the term ‘limited partner’ for purposes of the SECA rules.”); see also
Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137, 147–50 (2011) (holding that
owner-managers of a Kansas LLP law firm were not mere “passive investors” but rather active
managers and hence not “limited partners” as Congress intended for purposes of § 1402(a)(13)).
136. See Burke, supra note 25, at 576 (“When Congress enacted section 1411, it clearly
understood that income and gain from active pass-through businesses could potentially fall outside
all three of the 3.8% taxes.”).
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and eliminate the NIIT, yielding income and employment tax savings of
11.2%.137
Nevertheless, the interaction between § 199A and the disparate
employment tax regimes for pass-through entities can give rise to
surprising results. In the case of S corporations, an owner-manager’s
share of QBI is reduced by reasonable compensation and the employer’s
share of FICA taxes. In maximizing QBI and hence the § 199A
deduction, the formal requirement to pay reasonable compensation to
owner-managers may render S corporations less tax efficient than
partnerships, whose owners are not subject to the reasonable
compensation constraint but are subject to SECA taxes. Nevertheless, the
purported S corporation disadvantage may be largely negated if active
owner-managers are effectively unconstrained in their ability to pay
unreasonably low compensation, thereby avoiding both FICA and SECA
taxes and restoring S corporations to a favored position. Given the higher
tax stakes under the 2017 Act, enforcing the reasonable compensation
constraint will prove even more difficult.
Below the taxable income threshold, § 199A provides a
straightforward 20% deduction for qualified business income.138 In this
situation, paying any compensation to S corporation owner-managers is
doubly disadvantageous, since wages increase FICA taxes and reduce
QBI (and hence the § 199A deduction). Section 199A therefore heightens
the incentive of S corporation owner-managers to reclassify
compensation as a share of business income, thereby saving both income
and employment taxes. Given the § 199A incentives to reduce (or
eliminate) wages to maximize QBI, compensation paid to S corporation
owner-managers may be expected to decline even further relative to
business profits.139 Prior to the 2017 Act, the S corporation loophole
garnered attention mainly because of avoidance of the 3.8% Medicare tax
by high-income owner-managers. Under § 199A, the incentive to
minimize S corporation compensation is even greater below the Social
Security cap, since reclassifying wages as a distributive share saves an
additional 15.3% FICA tax (ignoring the employer deduction).
When the wage (or wage-and-property) limit is fully phased in,140
compensating high-income S corporation owner-employees may be
137. (40.8% − 29.6%).
138. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(3)(A).
139. See Susan C. Nelson, Paying Themselves: S Corporation Owners and Trends in S
Corporation Income, 1980-2013 4–5 (Office of Tax Analysis, Dep’t of Treas., Working Paper No.
107, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP107.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5DY-V8VC] (reporting of business-owners’ income as wages or profits
is responsive to tax law changes).
140. See supra note 57.
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either beneficial or detrimental. Within certain ranges, a quirk in the
operation of § 199A provides an incentive for a noncapital intensive S
corporation to overstate (rather than understate) compensation, since
owner wages are counted for purposes of the § 199A wage limit.141 The
final regulations under § 199A leave intact the beneficial quirk for S
corporations, while clarifying that the reasonable compensation
requirement applies only to S corporation shareholders.142 As the
Treasury recognized, the interaction between § 199A and the reasonable
compensation requirement gives rise to “disparities between taxpayers
operating businesses in different entity structures” and may have the
“unintended consequence of encouraging taxpayers to select or avoid
certain business entities.”143
C. Partnerships and Sole Proprietorships
The reasonable compensation constraint does not apply to partners,
who cannot be employees of a partnership.144 To maximize the § 199A
deduction, partnerships must nevertheless be careful to structure
compensation-like payments as a distributive share of partnership income
rather than § 707(c) guaranteed payments (or § 707(a) nonpartner
payments).145 Guaranteed payments are disfavored under § 199A from
the perspective of both the recipient partner (since they are not QBI) and
the partnership-payor (since they decrease entity-level QBI but do not
count toward the wage limit).146 Because partnerships are not obliged to
use guaranteed payments to compensate service partners, however, the

141. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 63 (“[The Senate bill] without explanation, haphazardly
weighted the dice in favour of using an S corporation . . . .”).
142. Qualified Business Income Deduction, REG-107892-18, Preamble, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884,
40,893 (Aug. 16, 2018) (“‘[R]easonable compensation’ is best read as limited to the context from
which it derives: compensation of S corporation shareholder-employees.”). The special rule for S
corporations is “merely a clarification” that such shareholder-employees are “prevented from
including an amount equal to reasonable compensation in QBI,” even if the S corporation fails to
pay reasonable compensation. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(H) (excluding
reasonable compensation received by S shareholders from QBI).
143. Qualified Business Income Deduction, T.D. 9847, Preamble, 84 Fed. Reg. 2,952, 2,964
(Feb. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Preamble to T.D. 9847].
144. See Self-Employment Tax Treatment of Partners in a Partnership That Owns a Disregarded
Entity, T.D. 9766, Preamble, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,693, 26,693 (May 4, 2016) (reaffirming the holding
of Rev. Rul. 69–184, 1969–1 CB 256, that treats a partner who performs services as a self-employed
independent contractor rather than an employee).
145. See I.R.C. § 707(a), (c) (governing nonpartner capacity payments and guaranteed
payments to partners for services or the use of capital). The recipient treats the guaranteed payment
as ordinary income, subject to the SECA tax; guaranteed payments do not constitute FICA wages.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-1(c), 1.1402(a)-1(b).
146. See Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(I) (excluding § 707(c) payments for services from
QBI); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(J) (same treatment for § 707(a) payments).
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purported guardrails under § 199A are largely illusory.147 Particularly if
high-income partners can also avoid SECA and the 3.8% tax, partnerships
will often prove more tax efficient than S corporations, since QBI and
hence the § 199A deduction are easier to maximize.
Sole proprietors are not subject to the reasonable compensation
constraint but cannot easily avoid SECA taxes. Not surprisingly, prior to
2017 the growth of S corporations was fueled largely by sole
proprietorships converting to S status to eliminate SECA taxes. For
purposes of § 199A, the deductible portion of the SECA tax imposed on
sole proprietors is treated in the same manner as the deductible employer
portion of the FICA tax; thus, the employer half of the SECA tax reduces
QBI for purposes of the 20% limit.148 Under the 2017 Act, converting a
sole proprietorship to S status and paying no owner-manager
compensation potentially maximizes the 20% deduction under § 199A,
while saving taxes equal to the avoided net SECA burden.149 If the
reasonable compensation constraint significantly disadvantaged S
corporations, one might expect a reversal of the trend for sole
proprietorships to convert to S status. Given the nearly insurmountable
difficulties of enforcing reasonable compensation, however, S
corporations are likely to maintain their preferred status by reducing
owner compensation to save employment and income taxes jointly.
Under the 2017 legislation, an individual’s itemized deduction for all
state or local taxes is capped at $10,000.150 Thus, pass-through owners
(partners, S corporation shareholders, and sole proprietors) potentially
stand to lose a substantial portion of the benefit from deducting state
income taxes on their share of business profits. In response to these
concerns, several states have restructured their state income tax regimes
by enacting an elective pass-through entity tax.151 The new entity-level
tax purportedly allows state income taxes to be deducted at the entity
level, circumventing the limitation on itemized deductions passed

147. See Kamin et al., supra note 6, at 1460 n.77 (“[R]estrictions . . . are easy for partners . . . to
avoid.”).
148. I.R.C. § 164(f); Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(1)(vi); see Preamble to T.D. 9847, supra note
143, at 2,962 (listing deductions that reduce QBI).
149. From a combined tax perspective, S corporation owner-managers who understate
compensation may often fare better than sole proprietors (or general partners) subject to SECA tax.
See Burke, supra note 68, at 586 (describing low-income and high-income scenarios).
150. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6). By contrast, C corporations may deduct as § 162 ordinary and
necessary business expenses any state or local income, property, or sales taxes incurred in
connection with business operations. I.R.C. § 162(f)(4).
151. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Red States, Blue States: Lessons from the State Death Tax Credit
and the “SALT” Deduction, 73 TAX LAW. 341, 362–63 (2020) (discussing elective entity-level tax
regimes).
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through to the individual owners.152 This work-around for the $10,000
cap provides an additional incentive for sole proprietors (and individual
owners of disregarded entities) to convert to S corporation status,
hopefully substituting a deductible entity-level tax on business profits for
a nondeductible itemized deduction. While the government could attack
these elective regimes under substance-over-form principles, it has so far
failed to do so, encouraging other states to adopt their own entity-level
taxes.153
VI. CONCLUSION
Even prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the case for outright repeal of
§ 199A was compelling: the pass-through deduction benefits primarily
high-income owner-managers and undermines the efficiency and equity
of the tax system. Although § 199A was rationalized on the ground that
it would reduce incentives for pass-through owners to incorporate, it
creates a new preference for pass-through income by encouraging
business owners to convert labor income into qualifying income to take
advantage of the deduction. In late 2017, proponents simply asserted that
§ 199A was needed to maintain parity between pass-through entities and
C corporations, without offering any meaningful definition of parity. In
political terms, § 199A was the price that the pass-through lobby
extracted for supporting the lowering of the corporate tax rate to 21%,
while preserving intact the pre-2017 favored status of pass-through
entities.
In light of growing concern over inequality and unsustainable deficits,
§ 199A should be repealed as quickly as possible. Congress also needs to
eliminate loopholes that allow active pass-through owners to avoid
employment and Medicare taxes on the disguised labor component of
pass-through income. Underreporting of pass-through income—which
often accrues in opaque categories—and employment taxes represents a

152. Entity-level state income taxes will reduce the pass-through owners’ share of nonseparately-stated items (but will not be subject to limitation at the individual level as separately
stated items). In describing the operation of § 164(b)(6), the Conference Report apparently
sanctions this gambit. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 260 n.172 (“[T]axes imposed at
the entity level, such as a business tax imposed on pass-through entities, that are reflected in a
partner’s or S corporation shareholder’s distributive or pro-rata share of income or loss on a
Schedule K-1 (or similar form), will continue to reduce such partner’s or shareholder’s distributive
or pro-rata share of income as under present law.”); see also JCT, GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra
note 5, at 68 n.296 (reiterating language of the Conference Report).
153. By contrast, the Treasury quickly shut down attempts to convert state taxes into deductible
charitable contributions. See REG-107431-19, 2020-3 I.R.B. 332–33 (addressing contributions in
exchange for state and local tax credits). The Treasury recently announced that it plans to issue
regulations clarifying the ability of partnerships and S corporations to deduct entity-level state and
local income taxes. I.R.S. Notice 2020-75, 2020-49 I.R.B. 1453.
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significant source of the “tax gap.”154 Properly understood, pass-through
parity would require S corporation owner-managers to pay selfemployment tax on their entire distributive share of income, reducing the
controversy over reasonable compensation. Similarly, Congress should
eliminate the outmoded limited partner exception used by active ownermanagers to avoid the 3.8% tax under Medicare and § 1411. Since
sophisticated pass-through tax avoidance is skewed toward the top of the
income scale, these reforms would be highly progressive and would help
to prevent further erosion of the social safety net.
Sensible reform would require all nonpublicly traded businesses to be
taxed as partnerships (including limited liability companies), S
corporations, or sole proprietorships.155 Elimination of § 199A would
ensure that pass-through income, other than capital gain, is taxed at the
same rate as wage income without the need for elaborate rules intended
to subsidize particular types of qualifying income.156 If the corporate tax
rate were increased modestly to 25% (or 28%) as widely discussed prior
to the 2017 Act, shareholders would continue to be taxed at capital gain
rates on distributed corporate profits. Increasing the capital gain rate to
25% would raise the combined corporate-shareholder tax rate on
distributed earnings to 46.6%,157 only slightly higher than the maximum
statutory rate (46%) on undistributed corporate profits prior to the 1986
Act. Depending on the highest individual rate, corporations might still
provide a shelter for disguised labor income, given the ability to earn a
higher after-tax return on reinvested earnings.158 Since corporate and
noncorporate business forms would enjoy roughly equivalent treatment,
however, the distorting effect of tax rate differences on choice of entity
would be greatly diminished.

154. Eliminating § 199A and closing the pass-through employment tax gap would raise an
estimated $730 billion over a ten-year period (2020–2029). Natasha Sarin, Lawrence H. Summers
& Joe Kupferberg, Tax Reform for Progressivity: A Pragmatic Approach, in TACKLING THE TAX
CODE: EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE 317, 318, 334, 340–41 (Hamilton
Project,
Brookings
Inst.,
2020),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
TaxBookforWeb_12320.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG56-YGAP].
155. REITs and RICs could still be subject to modified pass-through treatment.
156. Addressing the carried interest problem would eliminate the most egregious opportunity
to convert labor income into capital gain.
157. The combined rate equals 25% plus 28.8% × (1 − 25%).
158. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in Business Tax
Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2013) (noting that the pre-1986 two-tier corporate tax system
often functioned as “a shelter rather than a burden”).

